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3.1  Introduction 
Takeover defenses include all actions by managers to resist 
having their firms acquired. Attempts by target managers to 
defeat outstanding takeover proposals are overt forms of take- 
over defenses. Resistance also includes actions that  occur 
before a takeover offer is made which make the firm more 
difficult to acquire. 
The intensity of the defenses can range from mild to severe. 
Mild resistance forces bidders to restructure their offers, but 
does not prevent an acquisition or raise the takeover price 
substantially.  Severe  resistance  can  block  takeover  bids, 
thereby giving the incumbent managers of the target firm veto 
power over acquisition proposals. 
A natural place to begin the analysis of takeover defenses 
is with the wealth effects of takeovers. There is broad agree- 
ment that being a takeover target substantially increases the 
wealth of shareholders. Historical estimates of the stock price 
increases of target firms are about 20 percent in mergers and 
about 30 percent in tender offers.'  More recently, premiums 
have exceeded 50 percent. It does not require a lot of  com- 
plicated analysis to determine that the right to sell a share of 
stock for 50 percent more than its previous market price ben- 
efits target shareholders. 
At first glance, the large' gains for target  stockholders in 
takeovers seems to imply that all takeover resistance is bad. 
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Resistance makes the firm  more difficult  to acquire.  If  the 
defense works,  it  lowers the probability  of a takeover and 
stockholders are thus less likely to  receive takeover premiums. 
Even for an economist, it is hard to argue that shareholders 
benefit by reducing their chance to sell shares at a premium. 
But the issue is not that simple. Takeover resistance can ben- 
efit shareholders. Stockholders are concerned about the market 
value of the firm. The market value of any firm is the sum of two 
components: the value of the firm conditional on retaining the 
same management team; and ithe expected change in value of the 
firm from a corporate control change, which equals the proba- 
bility of a takeover times the change in value from a takeover. 
Value of  the:  Probability  Change in  Market 
= firm with current + of  a control x  value from a 
managers  change  control change 
Stockholders are concerned about how takeover defenses af- 
fect all three components of value: the value of the firm under 
current managers, the probability of an acquisition, and the 
offer price if  a takeover bid occurs. 
While takeover defenses may lower the probability of being 
acquired, they may also increase the offer price. Furthermore, 
takeover defenses can affect the value of the firm even if it is 
not acquired, that is, the value with its incumbent management 
team. For example, consider a defense that allows incumbent 
managers to completely block all takeover bids. This would 
reduce the probability of a cmtrol  change to zero and eliminate 
the expected takeover premium. The market price of the firm 
would then consist entirely of the value with  its incumbent 
managers.  This value arguably could be affected in two op- 
posite ways by  the takeover defense. First, the value could 
decrease as managers enjoy the leisure that the isolation from 
being fired provides. Second, the value could increase as man- 
agers stop wasting time and corporate resources worrying about 
a hostile takeover. 
It is difficult to determine  it priori whether takeover defenses 
are good or bad for stockholders. But one way to assess a take- 
over defense is to examine the rationale for resistance. Man- 
agers resist takeovers for three broad reasons: (1) they believe 
the firm has hidden values; (2) they believe resistance will in- 
crease the offer price; and (3) they want to retain their positions. 
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3.1.1  Managers Believe the Firm Has Hidden Values 
The managers of most corporations have private information 
about the future prospects of the firm. This information usually 
includes plans,  strategies, ideas, patents,  and similar items 
that cannot be made public.  Even if  efficient, market prices 
cannot include the value of information that the market does 
not have. When assessing a takeover bid, managers compare 
the offer price to their own estimate of the value of the firm. 
Their estimate, of  course, includes the value of  the private 
information that they possess. When the inside information is 
favorable, the managers’ per share assessment of value will 
exceed the market price of the firm’s stock. Offer prices above 
the market price of the stock could be below the managers’ 
assessment of its value. In such cases, managers would help 
stockholders by actively opposing the offer. 
Opposition based on “hidden values” is in the shareholders’ 
interests  only when the private  information  is valuable.  A 
problem is that the general optimism of managers about the 
future of their firms clouds their perception of values.  Most 
top managers usually argue that their firms are undervalued 
by the market. They believe the market is systematically in- 
efficient-it  always underestimates the value of their firm. But 
this optimism, or distrust of market prices, is an insufficient 
basis for opposing takeover bids. 
To  qualify as a potential stockholder wealth-increasing rea- 
son to oppose takeovers, the inside information must be of 
the type that an investor would pay to obtain. 
3.1.2  Managers Believe Resistance Will Increase 
the Offer Price 
In most transactions in which there is disagreement about 
value, it pays to haggle about price. Corporate takeovers are 
no exception. In mergers, the managers of the target and bid- 
ding firms negotiate directly.  In tender offers, however, the 
haggling generally occurs in the newspapers. The bidder cir- 
cumvents the target’s managers by making an offer directly 
to the shareholders. The target shareholders, therefore, lack 
a centralized bargaining agent. But takeover defenses can help: 
by making takeovers more difficult, resistance can slow down 
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tunity to enter the auction for the target firm. The most com- 
mon form of this behavior is, soliciting an offer from a “white 
knight”  after a hostile takeover bid. 
This auction seems to increase the final offer prices for target 
shares.  Ruback (1983) reports that  the final offer price ex- 
ceeded the initial offer by 23 percent in forty-eight competitive 
tender offers during the perilod 1962-81.  More recently, Brad- 
ley,  Desai, and Kim  (1986) find  that stockholder gains  are 
substantially greater when there are multiple bids. They report 
gains of 24 percent for targets in single bidder tender offers 
and gains of 41 percent for targets in multiple bidder contests.2 
Since takeover defenses can encourage competitive bidders 
to make an offer, these data provide some support for the view 
that resistance leads to highier offer prices. 
Some managers use this rationale to adopt extreme antitake- 
over defenses that virtually prevent hostile tender offers. They 
argue that without the board as a centralized bargaining agent, 
shareholders will  sell out at too low a price.  Such a view 
presumes that the market fior corporate control is uncompe- 
titive and inefficient. The weight of scientific evidence and the 
casual observation of  control contests suggests that such a 
view is incorrect.  Furthermore,  extreme forms of  takeover 
defenses can have some relatively severe side effects because 
it prevents the removal of inefficient managers. 
3.1.3  Managers Want to Retain Their Positions 
If the bidding firm plans to replace the target’s incumbent 
managers, the target’s managers have little incentive to en- 
dorse the  takeover  proposal.  Such an  endorsement would 
guarantee that they would lose the power, prestige, and value 
of the organization-specific human capital associated with their 
positions. 
In addition to the desire to retain their positions, managers 
are likely  to have the natural belief  that they are the best 
managers of the firm. Loyalty to employees also encourages 
resistance. Finally, being taken over can be considered a sign 
of failure: The premium indicates that the bidder believes it 
can manage the firm better than the incumbent managers. 
In summary, takeover resistance motivated by the first ra- 
tionale of hidden values and the second rationale of inducing 
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agers’ natural bias is likely to result in opposition to some 
takeovers that would benefit target  shareholders. The third 
reason for takeover defenses, managerial self-interest, benefits 
the stockholders only if  resistance happens by chance to be 
the appropriate action for one of the first two reasons. 
These three reasons for takeover defenses are not mutually 
exclusive-combinations  of the three are often present in de- 
fense strategies. For example, managers may use takeover de- 
fenses because they prefer friendly, negotiated transactions. 
Negotiated acquisitions enable the target managers to share 
ideas and information with the bidding firm. Consistent with 
the first and second reasons, this may increase the offer price. 
It also increases the chances of retaining the target’s manage- 
ment team, which is consistent with the third reason. Finally, 
a negotiated transaction is generally more civilized: to the man- 
agers that is like an increase in compensation. 
There is very little general evidence to assess the overall 
impact of  takeover resistance on stockholder values.  How- 
ever, Walkling and Long (1984) present some intriguing evi- 
dence: managers with large stockholdings in their firms are 
less  likely  to  oppose  takeovers  than  managers  with  small 
stockholdings. These data can be interpreted in two ways: 
either managers with large stockholdings oppose too little be- 
cause they risk losing the big payoff from being acquired; or 
managers with small stockholdings oppose too much, because 
they care about their jobs and have no equity gains to offset 
the loss in compensation. While not resolving whether there 
is too much or too little opposition, the Walkling and Long 
study does suggest the importance of the effect of takeovers 
on managers in the decision pro~ess.~ 
The stock price evidence tends to focus on individual types 
of defensive actions. In the next section, I explain and evaluate 
pre-offer defenses. Section 3.3 does the same for post-offer 
defenses. 
3.2  Pre-Offer Takeover Defenses 
In this section I describe several types of takeover defenses 
that occur prior to an actual takeover bid. These defenses are 
summarized in table 3.1. The table contains a brief description 
of the defense and its defensive impact, whether shareholder Table 3.1  Summary of Pie-Offer Takeover Defenses 
Type of 
Defense  Description  Defensive Impact 
Shareholder  Stock  Potential 
Approval  Price Effecta  Effectiveness 
Staggered 
board 
Board is classified into three equal 
groups. Only one group is elected 
each year. 
Bidder cannot obtain control of the  Required  -  l%b  Moderate 
target immediately after obtaining 
a majority of shares. 
Super-majority  A high percentage of shares required 
to approve a merger, usually 80%. 
Board can void the clause. 
Fair price  Super-majority provisions waived if 
bidder pays all stockholders the 
same price. 
Poison pill  Rights to preferred stock issued to 
shareholders. Rights can be 
exercised after a tender offer or 
the accumulation of a large block 
of shares by an outside party. In 
flip-over plans exercised rights can 
be used to purchase stock in the 
bidder on favorable terms. In flip- 
in plans exercised rights are 
repurchased by the issuing firm at 
a substantial premium. The 
bidding firm or large shareholder 
is excluded from the repurchase. 
Increases the number of shares  Required  -  5%*b  Mild 
required to obtain control in 
hostile takeovers. 
Prevents two-tier takeover offers.  Required  -  I%b 
Makes hostile tender offer 
prohibitively expensive. 
Not  ?C 
required 
Mild 
Severe Dual class  Distributes a new class of  equity to  Allows incumbent managers to  Required  2%** 
recapitalization  stockholders with superior voting  obtain a majority of votes without 
owning a majority of  the common  rights but inferior dividends or 
marketability. Allows shareholders  stock. 
to exchange the new shares for 
ordinary common stock. 
Severe 
aAn asterisk indicates statistical significance. 
bSee DeAngelo and Rice (1983), Linn and McConnell (1983), and Jarrell and Poulsen (1986). 
=:See Malatesta and Walkling (1985),  Ho (1986), Kidder, Peabody (1986), and SEC (1986). 
dSee  Partch (1986). 56  Richard S. Ruback 
approval is required, the stock price effect, and its potential 
effectiveness. The stock price effects are my round number 
summary of the detailed emlpirical studies. An asterisk indi- 
cates statistical significance. 
The potential effectivenes measure in table 3.1 is intended 
to capture the degree to which the defense would be effective, 
assuming that the incumbent management team uses it fully. 
I have described defenses as mild when they inconvenience 
bidders or force them to resiructure their bids without raising 
the takeover price significantly.  Severe defenses give the in- 
cumbent managers absolute veto power of corporate control 
changes. 
The potential effectiveness rating will differ from the stock 
price effect in at least three circumstances. First, the market 
may believe that the courts will prevent the incumbent man- 
agers from using the device, so that a very effective device 
will be associated with a small stock price effect. Second, the 
stock price effect might be small for an effective device be- 
cause the adoption was anticipated. Third, the stock price 
effect could be small because the change in the probability of 
being acquired, and thus the change in expected premium, is 
too small to be reliably  measured for even a very effective 
device. This is most likely lo occur when the firm is not the 
subject of takeover speculalion. 
3.2.1  Staggered Board Elections 
In this corporate charter provision, the board of directors 
is classified into three groups. Each year only one of the groups, 
or one-third of the directors, is elected. This makes it difficult 
for a hostile bidder to gain immediate  control of  the target 
firm, even if the bidder owns a majority of the common stock. 
About one-half of Standard & Poors 500 firms have adopted 
this type of takeover defen~e.~ 
My estimate of the stock plrice effect of adopting a staggered 
board  is -  1 percent,  which  is not  statistically  significant. 
DeAngelo and Rice (1983) examine the stock returns for 100 
firms  that  adopted  antitakeover  corporate  charter  amend- 
ments; 53 of  these included staggered boards. They find no 
significant stock price response to the adoption of the amend- 
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McConnell (1983) find no stock price effects for a sample of 
388 antitakeover amendments around the proxy mailing date. 
However, they find significantly positive returns over the in- 
terval from the proxy mailing date to the stockholder meeting 
date. More recently, Jarrell and Poulsen (1986) report nega- 
tive, but insignificant returns of about -  1 percent for twenty- 
eight firms that have adopted classified boards since 1980. 
Staggered boards are a moderately  effective takeover de- 
fense. By preventing a majority holder from obtaining control 
of the board for two years, this defense hinders the bidder’s 
ability to make significant changes in the corporation imme- 
diately. This limitation may in turn reduce the bidder’s will- 
ingness  to bid,  and may  increase  the bidder’s  difficulty  in 
getting financing. 
3.2.2  Super-Majority Provisions 
These corporate charter provisions require a very high per- 
centage of  shares to approve a merger, usually  80 percent. 
These provisions  are also typically accompanied by lock-in 
provisions  that require a super-majority to change the anti- 
takeover provisions. Some super-majority provisions apply to 
all mergers. Others are only applied at the board’s discretion 
to takeovers that they oppose or that involve a large stock- 
holder. Hostile takeover bidders require a higher percentage 
of  shares to obtain control of the target firm when the firm 
has a super-majority amendment. 
The  samples  of  antitakeover  amendments  examined  by 
DeAngelo and Rice (1983)  and Linn and McConnell  (1983) 
both included super-majority provisions.  Both studies found 
no significant negative stock price effects. But Jarrell and Poul- 
sen (1986) argue that these earlier amendments did not gen- 
erally include an escape clause for the board. They report that 
super-majority amendments with  escape clauses are associ- 
ated  with  a  statistically  significant  return  of  -  5  percent, 
whereas super-majority amendments without escape clauses 
are associated with insignificant returns of -  1 percent. 
In spite of the significant  stock price response, I consider 
a super-majority amendment a mild takeover defense. Bidders 
can respond to this amendment by simply tendering for the 
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quisition. Without a supermajority amendment, a partial offer 
could be used to obtain control. In this case, all stockholders 
would tender and receive a weighted average of the offer price 
and the postexpiration price. The bidder can respond to the 
super-majority amendment by simply offering this average price 
to all shareholders. 
3.2.3  Fair Price Amendments 
In these corporate charter changes, a fair price is defined 
as the same price. That is, a super-majority provision is waived 
if the bidder pays all stockholders the same price. About 35 
percent of firms have these amendments. 
Fair price  amendments  are designed  to  prevent two-tier 
takeover offers. In such offers, the bidding firm makes a first- 
tier tender offer for a fraction of the target’s common stock. 
The tender offer includes provisions for a second-tier merger. 
The merger price in the second tier is substantially below the 
first-tier  tender  offer  price.  This  provides  an incentive  for 
stockholders to tender to receive the higher price. Since most 
stockholders tender, and since the bidder accepts shares on a 
pro rata basis, most shareholders get a weighted average of 
the first and second tier offer prices, or the blended price. 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1986) report insignificant stock price 
changes of -  0.65 percent for 143 fair price amendments. Con- 
sistent  with  this  insignifica.nt stock  price  effect, fair  price 
amendments are a mild  takeover  defense. By  requiring the 
same price for all  shares, the bidder  is  forced to offer  all 
shareholders the blended price.  This restructures  the offer, 
but does not raise the cost of acquiring the target. 
3.2.4  Poison Pills 
These are preferred stock rights plans adopted by the board 
of  directors; shareholder approval is not generally required. 
However, the plans usually use “blank check preferred stock,” 
securities authorized by  stockholders and whose terms are 
determined by the board prior to issuance. In a poison pill, 
rights  to  preferred  stock  are  issued  to  stockholders.  The 
rights are inactive until they  are triggered.  A triggering event 
occurs when a tender offer is made for a large fraction of the 
firm, usually  30 percent,  or after a single shareholder accu- 
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triggered  rights can be redeemed by  the board of  directors 
for  a  short  time  after  the  triggering  event  occurs.  If  the 
rights  are not  redeemed, they can be exercised. There are 
two different  plans  for using  exercised  rights:  flip-over plans 
and flip-in plans. 
In flip-over plans the exercised rights are used to purchase 
preferred stock, for, say, $100. The preferred  stock is then 
convertible into $200 of equity in the bidding firm in the event 
of  a merger.  The primary  effect of  this plan is to raise the 
minimum offer price that shareholders would accept in a tender 
offer. For example, suppose a target’s stock price was $50. 
Shareholders would choose not to tender their shares for any 
offer  price  less than  the  $150 payoff  they  would  get from 
exercising the right ($50 of  stock plus $200 of  equity in the 
bidder minus the $100 cost of exercising the right). The min- 
imum premium, therefore, is 200 percent. 
In flip-in plans, the rights are repurchased from the share- 
holders by the issuing firm at a substantial premium, usually 
100  percent.  That is, the $100 of  preferred  stock would  be 
repurchased for $200. The triggering firm that made the offer, 
or the triggering large shareholder, is excluded from the re- 
purchase.  This repurchase  price  sets a lower bound on the 
minimum offer price that shareholders will accept. It also di- 
lutes the value  of  the bidding  firm’s equity position  in  the 
target, Flip-in plans often contain flip-over provisions that are 
effective for mergers. 
Poison pills are relatively recent phenomena.  Prior to the 
Delaware Chancery  Court decision  in  1985 that upheld  the 
legality of the plans, there were only three such plans. Cur- 
rently,  there are over 200 poison  pill  plans.  Because  these 
plans are so new, there is limited empirical evidence on them. 
In a study of  12 early plans,  Malatesta and Walkling (1985) 
find negative abnormal returns associated with the adoption 
of  poison  pills.  Ho  (1986) finds  no abnormal returns for a 
sample of 23 poison pills. The SEC’s study of 37  pills finds 
returns of -  1 percent for all pills and larger negative returns 
for firms that were subject to takeover speculation. A study 
of  167 poison pills by Kidder, Peabody, and Company finds 
no  stock  price  impact.  But  this  study  is  methodologically 
flawed, so that its conclusions are unreliable. The impact of 
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Both forms of  poison pills  are severe takeover  defenses. 
These plans have the potential to insulate incumbent managers 
completely from hostile takeovers. The plans cannot be cir- 
cumvented  by  restructuring bids.  Flip-in  plans  are  slightly 
more effective than flip-over plans because they prevent the 
creeping acquisitions of the type Sir James Goldsmith used in 
his attack on Crown-Zellerbach. 
3.2.5  Dual Class Recapitalizations 
These plans restructure the equity of the firm into two classes 
with  different voting  rights.  Usually,  the class with  inferior 
voting rights has one vote per share and the class with superior 
voting rights has ten votes per share. The superior voting stock 
is  typically  distributed  to  shareholders.  It  can then  be  ex- 
changed for ordinary common stock. The superior voting stock 
generally has lower dividends or reduced marketability; this 
induces stockholders to exchange their superior voting stock 
for inferior voting common stock. The managers of the firm 
do not participate in the exchange. This shifts the voting power 
of the corporation. Managers with relatively small equity hold- 
ings can control a majority of the votes after the recapitali- 
zation. This gives managers veto rights over control changes. 
Firms with dual class equily are relatively rare. Partch (1986) 
reports that forty-three firms issued limited voting stock over 
the period of 1962-84.  However, recently the New York Stock 
Exchange has requested permission from the SEC to change 
their one share, one vote rule to allow NYSE firms to adopt 
such dual  class  equity  structures.  These  recapitalizations, 
therefore, could become much more common in the near future. 
The empirical evidence presented by Partch (1986) is mixed. 
She reports a significant positive return of about 2 percent for 
the forty-three firms that adopted dual class plans. However, 
there are about as many increases as decreases in stock prices 
and the median is only about one-half of  1  percent. She con- 
cludes that the weight of the evidence suggests no significant 
stock price changes. Furthermore, these historical estimates 
may not be relevant for ass,essing the impact of a dual class 
recapitalization for a typical firm. As Partch emphasizes, the 
firms in  her  sample are atypical.  They generally  have  sub- 
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ownership was 49 percent of the firm prior to the recapitali- 
zation. Thus, the plans may not  have substantially changed 
the probability of being taken over for these firms. The man- 
agers’ approval would be required with or without the dual 
class equity. 
Dual class recapitalizations can be very effective takeover 
devices. By concentrating voting power in the hands of in- 
cumbent managers, the device prevents bidders from obtain- 
ing control by tendering for the outside shares. Even if a bidder 
were successful in acquiring all of the outside equity, it would 
not have sufficient votes to replace the incumbent managers 
or merge with the target. 
3.3  Post-Offer Takeover Defenses 
After a bidder makes a hostile tender offer, the defensive 
actions include many  of  the pre-offer  defenses, as well  as 
several actions that can be directed at a specific bidder. Table 
3.2 summarizes these post-offer defensive responses. 
3.3.1  Targeted Repurchases 
These transactions, popularly called greenmail, occur when 
a firm buys  a block  of  its common  stock held  by  a single 
shareholder or a group of  shareholders. The repurchase  is 
often at a premium, and the repurchase offer is not extended 
to other shareholders. Targeted repurchases can be used as a 
takeover defense by  offering an inducement  to a bidder to 
cease the offer and sell its shares back to the issuing firm at 
a profit. 
However, evidence presented by  Mikkelson and  Ruback 
(1986) indicates that only about 5 percent of 1  11 repurchases 
occurred after the announcement of a takeover attempt. About 
one-third of  the repurchases occurred after some less overt 
form of attempts to change control, such as preliminary plans 
for an acquisition attempt or proxy contests. Since two-thirds 
of  targeted  repurchases do not  involve any indication of  a 
brewing control contest, the classification  of  these transac- 
tions as takeover defenses is questionable. 
Empirical studies by Dann and DeAngelo (1983), Bradley 
and Wakeman (1983), and Mikkelson and Ruback (1985a, 1986) Table 3.2  Post-Offer Takeover Defenses 
Stock 
Price 









Repurchase of  block of shares held by a 
shareholder, usually at a premium. 
Eliminates a potential bidder.  -  3%b 
Limits ownership by a given firm for a specified  Eliminates a potential  bidder.  -  4%C 
time period. May include an agreement with a 
large shareholder to vote holdings with the board. 
Suit filed against bidder for violating antitrust or  Delays bidder. 
securities laws. 
O%d 
Assets bought that a bidder does not want or that 
will create antitrust problems.  Assets sold that 
the bidder wants. 
Makes the target less valuable.  -  2%*c,e 
Shares issued to a friendly third party or number of  Makes it more difficult to obtain the number of  -  2%*e 
shareholders increased. Shares repurchased at a 
premium from existing shareholders.  control. 
shares required for a hostile bidder to achieve 
aAn asterisk indicates statistical significance. 
bSee Dann and DeAngelo (1983), Bradley and Wakeman (1983), and Mikkelson and Ruback (198Sa, 1986). 
%ee Dann and DeAngelo (1983). 
dSee  Jarrell (1985). 
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report significant  stock returns  of  about  -3  percent at the 
announcement of the targeted repurchase. But Mikkelson and 
Ruback (1986) report that this loss is more than offset by stock 
price increases associated with the initial purchase of the  block 
and other intervening events. The negative stock price reac- 
tion to the targeted repurchase announcement, therefore, seems 
to be caused by the reversal of takeover expectations formed 
at the initial investment. Overall, the total return associated 
with these transactions, including the initial investment,  in- 
tervening events, and targeted repurchase is 7 percent, which 
is statistically significant. Consistent with this positive overall 
stock price effect, repurchasing firms seem to have a higher 
frequency  of  control  changes  subsequent  to the  targeted 
repurchase. 
3.3.2  Standstill Agreements 
These agreements limit the ownership by a given firm for a 
specified period of time. The agreement may involve allocating 
a number of seats on the board of directors to the large share- 
holder.  Also,  the shareholder may agree to vote with man- 
agement. These agreements serve as a takeover defense by 
eliminating, at least temporarily, a potential bidder. The share- 
holder may, however, gain some control over corporate assets 
through  seats on the board.  Thus, a standstill agreement is 
more like a treaty than a defense. 
Empirical results by Dann and DeAngelo (1983) show that 
the adoption of standstill agreements is associated with a sig- 
nificant fall in stock prices of about -  4  percent. Furthermore, 
Mikkelson and Ruback (1986) find that the negative returns in 
response to targeted repurchases are much greater when they 
are accompanied by standstill agreements. These agreements, 
therefore, seem to reduce the wealth of target stockholders. 
But this stock price fall could simply reflect the market’s dis- 
appointment that an expected takeover will not occur. Like 
the targeted repurchase finding, the negative returns may just 
represent the reversal of favorable expectations. 
3.3.3  Litigation 
Perhaps the most common form of post-offer defense is to 
file some sort of  suit against the bidding firm. Jarrell (1985) 64  Richard S. Ruback 
reports such litigation occurs in about one-third of all tender 
offers made between 1962 and 1980. The suits charge the bid- 
der firms with fraud, violation of antitrust or securities regu- 
lations, and so on. 
The litigation seems to serve two purposes. First, it delays 
the bidder, thereby encouraging the entry of competing bid- 
ders. Consistent with this view, Jarrell reports that the fre- 
quency of  competing bids is 62 percent for tender offers in- 
volving  litigation  and  11  percent  for tender  offers  without 
litigation. Second, the litigation encourages the bidder to  raise 
the offer price to induce the target to drop the suit and thereby 
avoid legal expenses. Jarrell reports that the stock price effect 
associated with filing the suit is about zero, on average, for 
seventy-one such litigations. This suggests that the defense is 
roughly a fair gamble. 
3.3.4  Acquisitions and Divestitures 
These changes in the firm’s asset structure can be used to 
defend against a takeover bid. Such tactics include divesting 
an asset that the bidder wants, buying assets that the bidder 
does not want, or buying assets that will create antitrust or 
other regulatory  problems.  Each of these actions make the 
target less attractive to the bidding firm, and reduces the price 
the bidder is willing to pay for the target. Data provided  by 
Dann and DeAngelo (1986) for twenty such transactions in- 
dicate that they reduce stock prices by about 2 percent, which 
is statistically significant. 
3.3.5  Liability Restructuring 
Issuing voting securities can increase the number of  shares 
required by a hostile bidder. Typically, the firm places these 
voting securities in friendly hands that agree to support the in- 
cumbent managers. Repurchase can also be used to reduce the 
number of public shares, making it more difficult to buy enough 
shares to obtain control. Such repurchases are often financed by 
debt issues that may make the firm less attractive to potential 
bidders. These restructures seem to reduce stockholder wealth. 
Dann and DeAngelo (1986) report stock price declines of 2 per- 
cent on average for thirty-one such restructurings. 65  An Overview of Takeover Defenses 
3.4  Conclusions 
I wish I could conclude that takeover defenses are generally 
good or bad for stockholders. But the answer is not that sim- 
ple. Furthermore ,  there isn’t enough evidence of experience 
with takeover defenses for precise conclusions. I do, however, 
think that the analysis and evidence support three propositions. 
First, defenses that give incumbent managers the power to 
veto hostile takeovers seem to be harmful. Of course, there 
are circumstances where such defenses can help stockholders, 
but I think those circumstances are relatively rare. Poison pills 
and dual class recapitalizations are cause for particular con- 
cern. There may be a way to circumvent the power that the 
incumbent managers have with these defenses, but no one has 
discovered it yet. 
Second, defenses that destroy assets are probably bad. This 
category includes assets sold below their values or assets pur- 
chased above their values simply to thwart a takeover. Sim- 
ilarly, liability restructuring to the extent that it interferes with 
investment also destroys assets. Once again there are circum- 
stances where such actions may help stockholders, but these 
cases are very rare. 
Third, defenses which do not give managers veto power and 
do not destroy assets, such as antitakeover corporate charter 
changes, are probably not harmful. These defenses may cause 
bidders to restructure offers. They may even result in slightly 
higher offer prices. Their major cost is that the defenses will 
reduce the benefit from being an acquiring firm and thereby 
reduce takeover a~tivity.~  However, there is no evidence that 
the frequency of takeovers has been reduced by antitakeover 
corporate charter amendments. 
In summary, some takeover defenses seem to be harmful. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the most harmful tactics seem to be 
the most recent innovations, such as poison pills. This is dis- 
turbing because these defenses are not subject to shareholder 
vote and thus are especially difficult to control. Of  course, 
they may just seem powerful because participants in the mar- 
ket have not yet had the opportunity to design tactics to cir- 
cumvent the defenses. 66  Richard S. Ruback 
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See Jensen and Ruback (1983) for a review of the evidence on takeovers. 
The stock returns are measured over the interval beginning five days 
before the first offer and ending forty days after it. 
See Mikkelson and Ruback (1985b) for a more detailed discussion of 
management compensation and takeovers. See also Lewellen et al. (1985). 
Frequency estimates are based  on data published  by  the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center, Inc., Washington, D.C. 
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